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Abstract 
 
As a professional philosopher that has participated in public philosophy forums for several years, I attempt to 
determine the character and value of public philosophy. To do this I adopt the perspective of Deweyan 
pragmatism, which I argue provides an effective theoretical framework for this purpose. Thinking particularly 
about relatively small, person-to-person philosophical forums, I argue that they share the main assumptions of 
the pragmatic method: a prevailing contingency with regard to starting points and conclusions, a willingness to 
entertain evidence from various sources and disciplines, and a commitment to continuing conversation on a 
variety of issues for the sake of continued growth and expansion of understanding. I believe it is unlikely that 
these sorts of conversations will deliver any immediate or obvious results in terms of improved democratic 
processes at the level of an entire community or nation because of the small scale and relatively narrow 
appeal. However, as a resource for intellectual growth, public philosophical forums provide an invaluable 
resource for those individuals willing to participate, professional philosophers included.   
     
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
No one needs specialized training to discuss the “big questions”—the philosophical issues 
that have engaged professional philosophers for centuries. Socrates, the untrained public 
philosopher par excellence, thought it the duty of everyone to engage in philosophical 
reflection, and the fact that the Apology is still standard fare in introductory courses suggests 
his enthusiasm is as relevant today as it was two millennia ago. While some bemoan what 
appear to be dwindling opportunities for public discourse, particularly on philosophical 
issues, it’s also clear that the internet has provided a wealth of forums of various types.1 
And despite a marked decrease in some of the traditional public forums, notably the 
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discussions fueled by liberal arts majors on college campuses, there are also efforts 
underway to bring people together for the old-fashioned, face-to-face discussions 
reminiscent of Socrates’ Athens. As a professional who moderates several of these latter 
sorts of forums, I have long been interested in determining what value public philosophizing 
has for the participants, for society at large, and for the practice of professional philosophy.   
 
We might begin by asking what sort of philosophy is best used to characterize these 
public exchanges. What are its goals? What are its methods? How does it compare to the 
practice of academic philosophy? Writing as a professional philosopher, I would like to 
suggest a theoretical perspective from which we might articulate the merit of public 
philosophy. Specifically, I suggest that we evaluate it from the point of view of the 
pragmatists, particularly the tradition influenced by John Dewey. Public philosophy, I 
argue, shares the pragmatists’ views about the practice of philosophy—for example, that 
it is non-foundationalist, open ended with respect to the goal of philosophical 
discussion, and inclusive of non-philosophical disciplines as part of the discourse. I am 
not claiming that pragmatism is the only avenue from which we might substantively 
assess public philosophy, but I think there is strong agreement between the practice and 
expectations of public philosophizing and the role that pragmatists see for philosophy, 
such that the pragmatist perspective allows us to articulate the value of these 
conversations quite effectively.  
 
I. The Nature of Public Philosophical Discourse 
 
I will begin with a description of what I have in mind when referring to public philosophy. 
While the internet has provided a variety of new forums, my own experience is mostly with 
moderating discussion in public places with bodily present participants. It’s worth noting 
that there are real differences between the sorts of discussion that take place online versus 
the face-to-face sort, owing to the scale and anonymity of online accessibility. For example, 
the face-to-face discussions are limited to members of the local community who can travel 
to the meeting, but an on-line discussion is potentially open to persons all over the world. 
On-line discussions also produce acrimonious exchanges far more frequently, which often 
degrades the discussion, sometimes to the point of exchanging insults. I cannot fully 
characterize these and other differences here, but I do want to acknowledge that there are 
some, and that my observations on public philosophy will pertain to the flesh-and-blood 
variety. However, I expect that much of what I will discuss applies to electronic discussions 
as well. 
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My observations on public philosophy stem from several years of involvement with various 
philosophy discussion forums. Probably the most relevant experience I’ve had is 
participation in a Socrates Café, the local forums that began appearing several years ago as 
a result of Christopher Phillips’ 2002 book by that tile. I’ve been attending these monthly 
meetings fairly regularly for about ten years and assumed the role of moderator four years 
ago. The discussions are hosted, promoted and advertised by a community library in my 
area and are attended by persons from a wide variety of backgrounds. Typical topics 
include: What is justice? Do we have a direct responsibility to the environment? What does 
it mean to be a responsible citizen? What is consciousness? As moderator, I might suggest 
ideas or relate some standard arguments to begin discussion, but mostly I let the participants 
carry on their own conversation. This format worked well enough that I began a similar 
discussion group on the campus where I am employed. “The Campus Alliance for Free 
Thought” operates as described above, except the discussants, consisting of faculty and 
students, obviously bring different perspectives to the table. Unless I say otherwise, 
however, I generally have the non-academic, Socrates Café forum in mind when referencing 
discussions in public philosophy. 
 
I have also presented a variety of lecture/discussion events to nonacademic audiences. Local 
Unitarian churches frequently request these, as do some libraries. I do not count a lecture 
itself as a form of public philosophy as long as the attendees are only passively involved 
and not actually engaging in conversation. However, the discussions that follow the lecture 
do encourage conversation, and they provide another opportunity to see how the public 
reacts to particular philosophical issues. 
 
Public philosophical forums have a unique flavor, different obviously from exchanges 
between professional academics, but different even than the discussion in an undergraduate 
philosophy classroom. In one sense, however, there is a basic similarity between a public 
forum and an undergraduate class: in both cases the individuals participating have little if 
any formal training in philosophy. Noting the salient differences between the two, I think, 
will reveal the unique characteristics of public forums. 
 
In what ways, then, are the discussions in public philosophy different than those in a typical 
freshman class? Most obviously, the institutional nature of the university brings with it a 
host of parameters not found in a public forum: students are enrolled for credit, with the 
requirement that they demonstrate a certain mastery of the material; the relationship 
between professor and student is one that involves a difference in power and authority; 
students are compelled to take courses for their degree; texts are involved, and students are 
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expected to read them; lectures and discussions are usually controlled by instructors, who 
may focus on a particular subject for as long as they deem necessary.  
 
In contrast, attendance at a public philosophy discussion is entirely voluntary, and the only 
persons in attendance are those with enough interest to travel to the destination and give up 
their evening. This ensures a certain level of enthusiasm on the part of all the attendees that 
is unlikely to occur in the classroom. But the attendees typically will not be willing or able 
to prepare in advance in the way of reading texts or completing assignments. And during the 
discussion, there is no incentive for participants to fully develop a line of thinking the way 
most instructors would insist upon in a classroom. It is not uncommon to watch discussants 
get most of the way to what seems to me to be a rewarding insight only to be derailed at the 
last minute and have the topic neatly changed. This is their discussion, and while my 
credentials as an academic and role as moderator give me some authority, it is not like that 
of the instructor in the classroom. The event, of course, could be structured so that I had 
more authority and steered the content according to what I thought most important, but then 
it would be more like persons attending a lecture, putting the attendees in a passive role, and 
not making them active participants. If the event is to be truly public philosophy, then the 
public must be doing the philosophy, not listening to the academic. I have the Socrates Café 
conversations in mind here, but it’s worth noting that all of this can be said for similar 
forums on campus. Students who attend these do so out of their own curiosity, not because 
they receive any sort of credit for a class, and the nature of the discussion is such that they 
feel free to express themselves in ways they would not in a classroom. The discussion 
provides insights into their own interests in the content, rather than their interest in getting a 
decent grade in a course. 
 
The discussion itself is also different than what I experience in the classroom. It follows 
lines determined by the discussants, who come to the discussion from many different 
backgrounds and levels of competence. They challenge each other, help each other clarify 
statements, and often discover ways of thinking about an issue that had never before 
occurred to them. But they are not likely to work toward even a contingent level of mutual 
agreement or consensus (which is not surprising since their academic counterparts are just 
as unlikely to do that). In a public forum, the discussants have such different backgrounds 
and perspectives, along with very different reasons why they find a topic of interest, that the 
conversation is pulled in many different directions. I am often reminded of Plato’s early 
dialogues, in which the conversation may turn in circles and end without any resolution. Yet 
the journey itself leaves the participants in some sense wiser than when they started, and 
that’s true both for Socrates and his interlocutor and the contemporary participants of a 
public philosophy forum.   
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With this description of public philosophy in mind, limited as it is to certain, relatively 
small-group forums, one might ask how and why the practice has value, particularly from 
the perspective of academic philosophy. Before raising that question, however, it will be 
useful to establish a philosophical framework from which to make an analysis, and for 
reasons I hope will become clear, I think pragmatism can very effectively fill that role. 
 
II. Deweyan Pragmatism and the Role of Philosophy in Public Life 
 
Referring generally to “pragmatism” or “the pragmatists” when we are well into the twenty-
first is somewhat problematic. The differences between the views of the major players in 
this tradition are wide-ranging. In fact, as Richard J. Bernstein has argued, there is no 
essence to pragmatism, though this very fact also gives it a richness and variety, one that I 
think makes it appropriate for some of the connections I will draw between pragmatism and 
public philosophy.2 Nevertheless, there are certain broad assumptions we can make to get 
started. First, the pragmatists sought to turn much of the tradition of philosophy on its head. 
Against the Platonic search for truth in a realm abstracted from the every-day world, the 
pragmatists sought to start with the messy circumstances of the world we live in. They also 
suggest an on-going method of arriving at beliefs through carefully crafting hypothesis, 
testing them through observation and refining them, as opposed to establishing fixed values 
or epistemological starting points. This method, having proven itself successful in the 
natural sciences, is carried over to traditional philosophical investigations, particularly by 
Peirce and Dewey. It means that our inquiries will always arrive at contingent, fallible 
truths. The method is also results-oriented, measuring the effectiveness of philosophy by its 
ability to address real problems. But perhaps the most important general characteristic of 
pragmatism, for our purposes, is in the pragmatists’ (particularly Dewey and Mead) 
conception of the social nature of the self. We become who we are through association and 
interaction with others, and conversation is the vital means to achieve his end. 
 
In this section, we will review the pragmatists’ views on these issues, including a discussion 
on the nature of the self, the role of philosophical inquiry in private and public life, and the 
role of the professional philosopher in public discourse. To keep the discussion from 
becoming too broad I will focus on the writings of John Dewey, which I believe yield the 
most important insights for our purposes. 
 
Throughout his writings, Dewey investigated the role of society in shaping the individual. 
“What [an individual] does, and what the consequences of his behavior are, what his 
experience consists of, cannot even be described, much less accounted for, in isolation.”3  
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Persons are not born with the innate skills that allow them to succeed in life. Rather, they 
develop habits—linguistic, social, emotional, and intellectual—that provide the basis for 
managing the world and directing their lives. That development, in turn, requires a 
substantial social engagement and the requisite social resources.   
 
The development of the self is not a process of achieving some finished end. Whether 
one is pursuing understanding through the sciences or other professional disciplines or 
one is enhancing one’s personal abilities and experiences, the pragmatic method aims at 
continual growth. We should never expect to cease learning and therefore should never 
expect to cease our investigations. “Intelligence is not something possessed once for all. 
It is in constant process of forming, and its retention requires constant alertness in 
observing consequences, an open-minded will to learn and courage in readjustment.”4 In 
our personal lives, the goal of any thinking person is clear: pursue education as a life-
long goal. For Dewey, there is no state of “being educated,” as if that were a terminal set 
of experiences. Without getting too deep into Dewey’s considerable work in the theory 
of education, it’s important to note that he thinks learning should extend beyond the 
formal, institutionalized education we require of our youth. The goal of education is 
continual growth, and a society that takes this task seriously must provide the 
opportunities to pursue that at every stage of life. 5 
 
Personal growth obviously requires a healthy society. We establish meaningful social 
identities by participating in various public groups, from local communities to the nation as 
a whole. As social beings, we are extremely dependent on our communities, which must be 
“emotionally, intellectually, and consciously sustained.”6 At bottom, this means we must 
establish associations in which persons form common values and meaning. Such 
associations keep societies operating as communities while they give individuals a sense of 
purpose. The importance of democracy in Dewey’s worldview is the culmination of his 
views on the relationship between individuals and their society: democratic participation is 
the means by which individuals create these healthy associations. This is bolstered by the 
social nature of the self and Dewey’s anti-essentialist sensibilities. No a priori principles 
will determine the nature of a just society. Working from real-world situations, democracy 
consists of persons participating in their community, thereby making it their community. 
 
And conversation is perhaps the most important way in which we might achieve this sense 
of democratic association. Of course, there are many kinds of conversation, and much of 
what counts as public, democratic discourse as it is today is not what the pragmatists have in 
mind. Political ads, particularly those in the United States, are funded by powerful, 
moneyed (often anonymous) interests, which aim to persuade through any means necessary. 
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But the sort of discourse that the pragmatists envision is like the coercion-free discourse that 
Habermas advocates, whereby participants engage each other to advance mutual 
understanding. This is similar to the experimentalism Dewey advocates generally: pursuit of 
understanding guided by intelligent examination of views and attention to how they work in 
the real world. Through these exchanges we develop increasingly effective ends, but they’re 
also valuable for the effect they have on individuals participating in them. Dewey 
characterizes them as “genuine conversation”: 
 
But in genuine conversation the ideas of one are corrected and changed by what 
others say; what is confirmed is not his previous notions, which may have been 
narrow and ill-formed, but his capacity to judge wisely. What he gains is an 
expansion of experience; he learns; even if previous ideas are in the main confirmed, 
yet in the degree in which there is genuine mutual give and take they are seen in a 
new light, deepened and extended in meaning, and there is the enjoyment of 
enlargement of experience, of growth of capacity.7 
 
Note the way in which this form of conversation simultaneously deepens links between the 
discussants while at the same time “enlarging the experience” of the individuals. And this is 
not just a discussion of professional academics or elites; it is the activity of the public itself. 
Cornel West, in arguing for his own version of pragmatism influenced in part by Dewey, 
emphasizes that “the prerogative of philosophers, i.e. rational deliberation, is now that of the 
people—and the populace deliberating is creative democracy in the making.”8 West does 
not think that Dewey goes far enough in providing an understanding of social conditions 
and revolutionary possibilities that he sees as central to the success of pragmatic 
conversation, but he nevertheless sees Dewey’s concept of intelligent discourse as a 
necessary basis for addressing public problems. 9 The Deweyan tradition, in short, sees 
conversation as a way to achieve the community upon which a legitimate democracy can 
operate.   
 
Note that for Dewey, genuine conversation was a way to obtain substantive solutions to 
real-world problems. By persons articulating and sharing concerns, we are better able to 
find a way to deal with them. The experimental method could then be applied to discover 
and hone solutions. More recent pragmatists see the goal of deliberation in more general 
terms. Richard Rorty sees the lessons of pragmatism in teaching us to continue to find 
vocabularies that allow us to better understand the world and to root out exhausted and 
fruitless vocabularies. For Rorty, the conversation ought not to be judged by its ability to 
accomplish specific goals, and certainly not as a means of bringing us to the Truth. Rather, 
it is in itself a worthwhile means of advancing meaningful ways to look at the world. “The 
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pragmatists tell us that the conversation which it is our moral duty to continue is merely our 
project, the European intellectual’s form of life. . . Further (and this is the crucial point) we 
do not know what ‘success’ would mean except simply ‘continuance.’ We are not 
conversing because we have a goal, but because Socratic conversation is an activity which 
is its own end.” 10  Many commentators question whether this view of conversation is 
consistent with Dewey’s, a point I will return to shortly, but for our purposes it is important 
to note that maintaining conversations lies at the center of the pragmatists’ sense of how 
healthy societies function. 
 
What then, is the role of the professional philosopher in all of this? It is, first of all, not that 
of the traditional Platonic or Enlightenment-era philosophers, pursuing their own esoteric 
theories in the isolation of the ivory tower. With regard to the content of philosophy, 
philosophers must orient themselves to the problems of their contemporaries. As Dewey 
states, “Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the 
problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing 
with the problems of men.”11 He would have us abandon the esoteric subject matter that 
largely constitutes the tradition. But it’s not just an issue of content; Dewey would have 
professional philosophers facilitate the development of social ends and the means to 
accomplish them among the public. “Unless professional philosophy can mobilize itself 
sufficiently to assist in this clarification and redirection of men’s thoughts it is likely to get 
more and more sidetracked form the main currents of contemporary life.”12 Philosophers are 
in a position to make connections between values and practices, providing explanations that 
enable us to better comprehend and control the forces that affect our lives. As Kenneth 
Stikkers explains, the Deweyan view of the responsibility of philosophers is to bring the 
public “to self-awareness through the use of traditional cultural symbols and the forging of 
new symbols to create shared meanings and feelings of common interest.” 13  In short, 
professional philosophers in the pragmatic tradition ought to facilitate the genuine 
conversation discussed above, and hopefully on a scale large enough to make a difference. 
 
But if this is the task of the professional philosopher, it is by no means constrained to the 
traditional discipline of philosophy. In fact, one of the enduring lessons of the pragmatic 
tradition has been the interdisciplinary nature of conversations both in and out of academia. 
Philosophy has no privileged role in solving problems. Dewey, for example, used 
discoveries in biology to further his views on language, art and education. Contemporary 
philosophers, particularly Rorty, have been more strident about this. Rorty, in fact, 
admonishes his professional peers for their self-absorption. 
 
Essays Philos (2014)15:1                                                                                                        Pamerleau  | 164 
 
 
 
Ceasing to worry about the autonomy of philosophy means, among other things, no 
longer wanting to draw nice clear lines between philosophical questions and 
political, religious, aesthetic, or economic questions. Philosophy will not play the 
modest but essential role that Dewey assigned it, and so will not succeed in taking 
time seriously, unless we philosophers are willing to accept a certain 
deprofessionalization and to acquire a certain insouciance about the question of 
when we are doing philosophy and when we are not.14 
 
Understanding the world, attempting to find better vocabularies, or finding ways to set and 
achieve goals may require that we draw from science, art, philosophy or literature, 
according to Rorty. Philosophy has no privileged vocabulary to guide them all. 
 
Note that there is some disagreement among pragmatists about whether Rorty’s 
contemporary take on the role of philosophers can rightly be linked to Dewey, and this 
disagreement will bear on our application of pragmatism to public philosophy in the next 
section. Rorty claims that he gets from Dewey his rejection of philosophy as a privileged 
method. Furthermore, he thinks that a pragmatist culture “would contain nobody called ‘the 
Philosopher’ who could explain why and how certain areas of culture enjoyed a special 
relation to reality.”15 Rorty has been often criticized for this view, both on the grounds of its 
own plausibility and on how Deweyan this view really is. James Campbell is one of many 
who objects to Rorty’s vague reference to pragmatists, asserting that “the stance suggested 
by Rory is often so unpragmatic, at least in the historical sense, that I am led to wonder who 
these pragmatists are.”16 Campbell’s concern centers on Rorty’s insistence that pragmatism 
abandons any sense of a privileged method, despite the fact that Dewey advocates for the 
pragmatic method again and again. Gouinlock, makes a similar point, arguing that 
throughout his works, Dewey advocated for the scientific method as a preferred and 
effective means of resolving real-world difficulties. This method is essentially an 
empiricism, anchored in a careful attention to the experienced results of our various sorts of 
“hypotheses.” If Gouinlock is right about Dewey, than Dewey would seem to have a 
stronger sense of practical purpose for pragmatic philosophy and the effectiveness of its 
method than Rorty acknowledges. Gouinlock’s reading of Dewey would suggest that some 
conversations are more worthwhile than others, specifically those directed by this method. 
“The idea of democratic method and aim as mere conversation was, in effect, rigorously 
opposed by Dewey,” claims Gouinlock.17  
 
There is, then, some difference about the sort of discourse that a Deweyan pragmatic 
philosophy should engage in. Some, like Gouinlock, suggest that there is a specific method, 
one with definite intellectual virtues that are inspired by the scientific method. “The virtues 
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include a willingness to question, investigate, and learn; a determination to search for clarity 
in discourse and evidence in argument.”18 Rorty, on the other hand, does not think that what 
Dewey advocates really amounts to a method at all, and that there really is nothing special 
about a philosophical conversation that would make it more effective than those of any 
other discipline. Regardless of where one stands on this issue, however, there is no doubting 
that all pragmatists think that intellectual inquiry in general should not be enclosed within 
isolated disciplines. In fact, contemporary philosophers who share this element of 
pragmatism (like Habermas) invoke the works of sociologists and psychologists as readily 
as those of the philosophical tradition. The pragmatic process of deliberation is, then, 
decidedly interdisciplinary, even if there are disagreements about whether pragmatism must 
include a particular method. 
 
To conclude, we can characterize the pragmatic perspective as I have been articulating it 
here with the following summary statements. a) Pragmatism involves a method whereby 
beliefs and values are considered contingent and open to revision in an ongoing process of 
experimental revision and open, interdisciplinary conversation. b) Pragmatism envisions a 
democratic society wherein individuals form community through direct association, 
determining the saliency of issues and guiding values through public deliberation. c) 
Individual in these societies aim at continual intellectual development and growth, largely 
through the development of healthy habits that stem from participation in the community. d) 
Professional philosophers ought to prioritize their efforts according to the real-world needs 
and conditions of their society, acknowledging that the discipline is no longer the Queen of 
the Sciences and that they ought to welcome the insights of other disciplines. 
 
III. The Value of Public Philosophy from the Pragmatic Perspective 
 
The four summary descriptions of pragmatism in the preceding paragraph can be used to 
shed light on the practice of public philosophy as that was described in section I. What is 
the value of public philosophy, from the pragmatists’ perspective? 
 
a) The Pragmatic Method 
 
The public discourse of philosophical themes in many ways makes assumptions similar to 
what the pragmatists call for in the pursuit of understanding. But in saying this I fully 
acknowledge it is not true of the individuals who constitute these discussion groups. Most 
are not acquainted with pragmatism, and I have no sense that they would subscribe to it if 
they were. In fact, as individuals, the discussants in public gatherings are without a common 
epistemological bent.  Some are trained scientists, some are dedicated to religious outlooks, 
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some have almost a Platonic disposition toward truth, some are committed skeptics, etc. So 
if we’re looking for the pragmatic perspective as a conscious set of assumptions that 
everyone has agreed to follow, you are unlikely to find it. However, I would contend that 
the nature of the discussion, in its group dynamic, does invoke the characteristics of the 
pragmatic method described in the previous section. 
 
First, discussants realize that they are in a public forum and that others seated around the 
table may well have different views than their own. They expect that others are going to 
disagree on some things and agree on others, and most who care to attend such an event are 
mindful of that. My limited experience with online forums is that there is less toleration for 
differences, but as a whole one can say that in either case there are no expectations of fixed 
starting points or epistemological orientations. The discussion must be open to a variety of 
inputs. The group as a whole will continue to pursue a line of thinking because it bears 
fruit—it’s one that makes sense to most of the discussants—and will quickly abandon views 
that seem overly idiosyncratic or unsupportable. Nevertheless they are willing to consider 
almost anything. This sort of open-mindedness is exactly the quality that Gouinlock 
identifies as a principle part of the pragmatic method, “a readiness to hear and respect the 
views of others, to consider alternatives thoroughly and impartially, and to communicate in 
a like manner in return.”19 
 
More, the group’s varied backgrounds mean that no one discipline is privileged. Those who 
attend these discussions generally have some intellectual curiosity to begin with, and that 
means they are likely to pay attention to developments in science and current events. Most 
are educated outside of philosophy, though some either do read philosophy or have done so 
at some point. All of this they bring with them to the discussion. So while I may introduce 
an argument from the philosophical tradition as a means of getting a discussion going, the 
discussants are as likely to reply with a news item, some science they are aware of, or a 
personal experience. The discussions, then, are essentially interdisciplinary, and no one sort 
of claim is privileged in the group. Even if the issue under discussion is from a professional 
philosopher’s perspective wholly philosophical (e.g., what is beauty?), it is not uncommon 
that the discussion will follow a purely scientific debate at some point (e.g., do people see 
the world as animals do?). This sort of play between traditional philosophical discussions 
and other disciplines, particularly science, is precisely what Dewey had in mind as the best 
direction for philosophy. “Pragmatism is content to take its stand with science” on issues 
about matters concerning reality, Dewey states, in that there is an openness to all forms of 
investigation and the gathering of relevant data.20 
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And finally, a line of questioning does not last long if it’s too esoteric. Participants tend to 
steer the conversation according to what is pertinent to their interests or those of their 
community. The close association of value and inquiry in pragmatism is faithfully mirrored 
here: the discussion is driven by what matters to the lives of those engaging the 
conversation. In fact, conversations tend to return frequently to normative concerns, and in 
general ethical issues are the most popular in discussion groups where the participants pick 
the topic. 
 
So in these ways the discussion resembles the method of inquiry promoted by the 
pragmatists. One way in which it is not, however, is in the lack of a structure that would see 
an investigation carried out to some practical consequence. Quite frankly, nothing is ever 
really solved, and nothing tangible ever gets done. But this is not the purpose of the 
discussion in the first place. They are not like a committee assigned with a task, but a group 
of people engaging in philosophical-based discussion for its own sake. Whether that makes 
the endeavor worthwhile or not I will soon address. 
 
b) Public Philosophy’s Contribution to Democracy 
 
For Dewey, the value of philosophy for society was in its ability to promote a “genuine 
conversation,” creating the basis for a democratic community. Are the sort of community 
exchanges I have been describing a Deweyan genuine conversation? Yes. Can they affect 
the restoration of a healthy democracy? I have to admit that I think they cannot. In this 
section I will explain my mixed views on this topic. 
 
A public philosophical discussion is a genuine conversation, in the sense that its main goal 
is for persons to listen to what others say and learn something, as well as to hear how others 
react to their own views. Sometimes minds are changed, but as often as not the discussants 
merely get a better understanding of why they think the way they do. Still, this is an 
expected outcome of genuine conversation. Recall Dewey’s description:  “even if previous 
ideas are in the main confirmed, yet in the degree in which there is genuine mutual give and 
take they are seen in a new light deepened and extended in meaning, and there is the 
enjoyment of enlargement of experience, of growth of capacity.” This is a very good 
description of what I believe many take away from the public discussions I have witnessed.   
 
The regulars of such a group get to know one another, intellectually if not personally, and 
seem to respect one another even if they do not agree. Within these groups, it’s clear that 
there is an intellectual community that could be the model for a meaningful democracy. 
This is never truer than when the discussion turns political and there are opposing views on 
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the table. Even when the disagreement is vehement, there is always an attempt to 
understand the opposing position. The nature of a philosophical discussion, giving reasons 
and asking others for their, invites understanding if not agreement. Compare these 
exchanges to televised political debates in an election season, or the barrage of disparaging 
television ads that lead up to elections. A Socrates Café in its most acrimonious moments is 
a far cry from these. 
 
But I do not think that these public forums can achieve the lofty goal of enhancing 
democracy for the society overall. The reason is that the persons who probably most need to 
enter into these conversations do not attend them, and I see no way of inducing them to do 
so. The Socrates Café events I moderate are well-advertised (each meeting is announced in 
the local paper), but the largest gatherings rarely amount to more than twenty persons. 
Sometimes there is only a handful. The same can be said for student groups. Granted, I am 
not located in the heart of a major city, but no place that I am aware of enjoys public 
philosophical discussions on a scale large enough to substantially affect the political process 
of the entire community, even if one adds electronic forms of discussion to the total. Many 
persons simply have no interest in these sorts of discussions, and I will venture to guess that 
those who are most entrenched in their positions are not likely to engage in the sort of 
probing that attracts those who relish the conversation. Recall that creating associations is 
the purpose of democratic conversations. As Dewey states, “The prime difficulty, as we 
have seen, is that of discovering the means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold 
public may so recognize itself as to define and express its interests.”21 Simply offering these 
public exchanges does not do much to unite or express the interests of the public at large, 
only a small part of it at best. 
 
The degree of interest in philosophical conversation is an empirical issue for which I can 
only offer anecdotal evidence, but I think it is safe to say that offering public philosophical 
forums will not spark genuine conversation on the scale necessary to mend an ailing 
democracy. To achieve that we would need additional incentives from a source with enough 
pull to entice or compel a much larger portion of the population to talk. What that source 
would be and whether we really want it to do this are, of course, issues far beyond what I 
can address here.  
 
c) The Benefits of Public Philosophy to Individuals 
 
So the public forums I have been discussing will not likely benefit the public overall in a 
substantial way, but can we at least say that public philosophy discussions are beneficial for 
those individuals who do pursue them? Here the debate on whether Rorty is right to eschew 
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a particular method in philosophy may bear on our answer. According to one line of 
thinking, staying true to Dewey means expecting that our conversations will have some sort 
of measureable impact. People’s lives will be made better because we articulated difficulties 
and found solutions. Dewey often sounds like this is what he expects from the sorts of 
conversations he proposes. We should have effective conversations, not mere conversations. 
If the sort of public philosophy forums I have been discussing do not produce any 
measureable difference in the world, perhaps they are of no real benefit.   
 
But if Rorty is right, perhaps the continuing of conversation is a real benefit. If public 
conversations broaden and deepen understanding and allow people to discover new 
vocabularies, that may be by itself a worthwhile endeavor. Maybe Rorty’s pragmatism, with 
less expectations for what conversation can do, provides a better basis to appreciate the 
benefit of “mere conversation” to individuals who engage in it. 
 
I think, however, that one need not follow Rorty to see the benefit of these conversations. 
One could argue that public philosophy is indeed a benefit no matter how disposed you are 
to stick to Deweyan roots. First, it should be noted that Dewey does not think that 
philosophy, even professional philosophy, is directly a matter of solving problems. Rather, 
it provides the basic visions of what sorts of persons we should be and what sort of a society 
we should live in. We must, indeed, keep sight of the real conditions of life that we live in, 
but thinking about the big questions helps provide the perspective and direction for more 
practical endeavors. 
 
When it is understood that philosophic thinking is caught up in the actual course of 
events, having the office of guiding them towards a prosperous issue, problems will 
abundantly present themselves. Philosophy will not solves these problems; 
philosophy is vision, imagination, reflection—and these functions, apart from action, 
modify nothing and hence resolve nothing. But in a complicated and perverse world, 
action which is not informed with vision, imagination, and reflection, is more likely 
to increase confusion and conflict than to straighten things out.22 
 
But even if public philosophy cannot even do that—provide its participants with a better 
vision of how we should live—there is yet another way in which it would be beneficial on 
Deweyan grounds: as a form of personal growth. If Dewey is right, then one of our most 
important goals in life is continual growth, and this is just what Dewey expects genuine 
conversation to achieve: “the enjoyment of enlargement of experience, of growth of 
capacity.” In this way, such forums provide a resource that allows persons to continue the 
process of education beyond the walls of schools and universities, and Dewey thinks such 
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resources are vital to a healthy society. “Hence, education means the enterprise of supplying 
the conditions which insure growth, or adequacy of life, irrespective of age.”23 
 
In fact, my experience suggests that many persons find these discussions deeply 
satisfying. At one recent Socrates Café meeting, in preparation for this very essay, I 
asked the attendees if and why they thought our conversations were valuable. No one 
indicated that they attended out of some sense of responsibility for democratic progress 
or community-building, even when I directly asked that. The common reply was that 
they attended out of their own curiosity. They wanted to hear what others had to say 
about the topics we discuss, and in general they just thought the discussions were 
“interesting.” That sort of response—that they attend because it is personally satisfying 
to do so—I have heard for years. With student discussion groups, I have been told by 
more than one student that he or she looks forward to the regular meetings as the high 
point of the week. All of this corroborates Dewey’s sense that genuine conversation 
aimed at growth is an inherently satisfying human activity. 
 
d) The Role of Professional Philosophers in Public Philosophy 
 
What, then, of the role of the professional philosopher in the sort of public philosophy 
exchanges I am describing? It surely matters what sort of philosopher you are. If you think 
the main role, or only role, of professional philosophy is to advance our understanding of 
conceptual matters though careful and sustained inquiry with your fellow professionals, 
producing the sort of work found in journals and academic presses, then public philosophy 
will hold little interest for you. The discussions are frankly too unstructured and often too 
elementary. I do not object to this form of professional philosophy, however. I think there is 
value in it, and I engage in it myself. But if you are sympathetic to the Deweyan pragmatic 
perspective I have been explaining, you may find there really is interest in what happens in 
these public conversations. 
 
First, academic philosophers do certainly contribute to public discussions that bear on 
philosophical topics. In fact, some professionals frequently put themselves before the 
public to help further our larger conversations: Peter Singer, Cornel West, the various 
contributors to The New York Time’s “The Stone” opinion section, etc. These 
philosophers are lucky enough to have their views conveyed through the major media, 
and it is this sort of contribution that Deweyan pragmatists would consider to be 
extremely important, especially if it helps generate large scale awareness and discussion 
of salient issues. This would be an example of philosophers helping to articulate what 
social problems are, applying their skills to the solution of real-world problems. But this 
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is not public philosophy as it has been pursued in this paper. Rather, these activities are 
philosophers using their expertise to inform and perhaps steer discussions of public 
opinion. From the pragmatists’ perspective, this sort of contribution should be 
encouraged. But we might better describe its value in terms of the professional 
philosopher’s contribution to public policy discussions, as opposed to the value of a 
professional philosophers’ presence in a discussion among non-philosophers. This is a 
matter of social distance. Writing an article in a newspaper or having a lecture appear on 
YouTube gives the public something to talk about. Actively participating in a direct 
conversation allows the philosopher to interact directly with the discussants. 
 
So what about that latter sort of contribution—the professional’s participation in public 
philosophical forums, which are usually small and not likely to shape public opinion or 
policy in a substantial manner? Firstly, there is a potential value to professional 
philosophers themselves.  In attending public forums, one gets a sense of what is relevant to 
people in our contemporary society. As I pointed out earlier, discussants usually have little 
patience for conversations that become too esoteric and removed from their living concerns. 
They do like to discuss philosophical topics, but they do so because it matters to them. If 
Dewey is right that philosophers must pay attention to the needs of the citizenry in their 
practice of philosophy, then listening to how the nonprofessionals receive and apply 
philosophical ideas to their lives might influence what we professionals consider 
worthwhile areas of investigation. Rorty urges us to be open to the contributions of 
disciplines like science and art as we pursue our philosophy, and the open, interdisciplinary 
nature of public philosophy might be enjoyed in that vein.  
 
Secondly, the discussants can benefit substantially from the participation of a professional 
philosopher. Because we professionals are familiar with traditional arguments and theories 
and are skilled at thinking through these issues, we can make an effective contribution to the 
conversations among intellectually curious individuals. We can explain well-worn paths and 
where they have led. We can point out improper use of evidence and faulty argumentation. 
As I pointed out earlier, this may not contribute to the furthering of democracy at the level 
that Dewey had hoped for (where the public itself overcomes its divided interests through 
renewed associations), but it furthers the exploration that the participants hoped for when 
they showed up. By actively participating in public forums, then, we professionals are 
effectively making ourselves a resource for growth. 
 
In conclusion, I have suggested that a Deweyan version of pragmatism provides a useful 
perspective from which to think about the character and value of public philosophy. 
Thinking particularly about relatively small, person-to-person philosophical forums, I argue 
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that as a group they share the main assumptions of the pragmatic method: a prevailing 
contingency with regard to starting points and conclusions, a willingness to entertain 
evidence from various sources and disciplines, and a commitment to continuing 
conversation on a variety of issues for the sake of continued growth and expansion of 
understanding. I believe it is unlikely that these sorts of conversations will deliver any 
immediate or obvious results in terms of improved democratic processes at the level of an 
entire community or nation because of the small scale and relatively narrow appeal. 
However, as a resource for intellectual growth, public philosophical forums provide an 
invaluable resource for those individuals willing to participate. Professional philosophers, at 
least those who share something of the pragmatists’ view on philosophy, might benefit from 
listening to public philosophy exchanges, but their active participation in them is certainly a 
benefit to all concerned. 
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